

# MOTION FOR DISCOVERY

**Docket #: S20N-CR19-0147994-S**

**Submitted date: JUNE 2, 2021**

I was arrested Feb. 6, 2019 for alleged Second Degree Email Harassment based on an Oct. 2018 submitted Warrant which was based on a Sept. 2018 investigation yielding Discovery Emails aka Alleged Probable Cause in Sept of 2018. In May of 2019 I brought to the attention of Prosecutor Suzanne Vieux that someone – either Complainant Anna Paige Campbell or Investigating/Arresting Officer Mark Grasso submitted an inauthentic doctored Email as “Discovery” aka VIOLATING Section 53-155 – Tampering with or Fabricating Physical Evidence. **In JANUARY 2020 having nothing to hide or DELAY, I allowed a search and seizure warrant for my Emails. THESE SEIZED EMAILS WERE 15 MONTHS AFTER POLICE SHOULD HAVE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE. THESE ARE EMAILS THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE AT THE TIME OF WARRANT AND DEFINITELY AT TIME OF ARREST IN FEB. 2019.**

**I NOW ASK FOR THESE SEIZED EMAILS AKA DISCOVERY BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:  
RULE 3.3(a)(3)**

Because a prosecutor must always seek the truth, he or she may not offer evidence that the prosecutor knows is false. Similarly, if a prosecutor comes to learn of the falsity after the evidence has already been offered, he or she must take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosing the falsity to the tribunal. Rule 3.3(a)(3). The duty to correct a material falsehood continues until the

**RULE 3.4(4)**

A prosecutor must not do anything solely for the purpose of embarrassing or burdening a defendant, a witness or any other person involved with a matter the prosecutor is handling. Rule 4.4(a) (Respect for Rights of Third Persons). As a minister of justice, a prosecutor must not: (1) unlawfully obstruct the defendant’s access to evidence; (2) alter, conceal or destroy evidence or assist another in doing so; (3) falsify evidence; (4) counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely; or (5) offer an inducement to a witness that is not allowed by law. Rule 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel). He or she should not make frivolous discovery requests and should make reasonably diligent efforts to comply with legal discovery requests from the defendant. Rule 3.4(4).

**Rule 3.8** provides that a prosecutor shall:

(1) Refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;

(2) Make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;

(3) Not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing;

(4) Make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal; and

#### **Rule 3.8(4) - Discovery Obligations**

In *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution.” A prosecutor who “withholds evidence . . . which, if made available, would tend to exculpate [the defendant] or reduce the penalty . . . casts the prosecutor in the role of an

In *Giglio v. United States*, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), the Court held that impeachment evidence—i.e., any “evidence affecting [the] credibility” of prosecution witnesses—falls within *Brady*’s definition of exculpatory evidence that must be disclosed to the defense. Under *Giglio*, the prosecution is responsible for the nondisclosure of impeachment evidence regardless of whether such nondisclosure resulted from negligence rather than design. *Id.* *Brady* and *Giglio* impose an independent obligation on the prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence; hence, *Brady* / *Giglio* material must be disclosed to the defense even if opposing counsel has not asked for it. Moreover, *Giglio* imposes an affirmative

**SOMONE – EITHER COMPLAINANT ANNA PAIGE CAMPBELL OR ARRESTING OFFICER MARK GRASSO IS GUILTY OF THE FOLLOWING FELONY AND HAS BEEN AT LARGE FOR NEARLY 3 YEARS!!!**

**2018 Connecticut General Statutes  
Title 53a - Penal Code  
Chapter 952 - Penal Code: Offenses  
Section 53a-155 - Tampering with or fabricating physical evidence: Class D felony.**

**Universal Citation:** CT Gen Stat § 53a-155 (2018)

(a) A person is guilty of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence if, believing that a criminal investigation conducted by a law enforcement agency or an official proceeding is pending, or about to be instituted, such person: (1) Alters, destroys, conceals or removes any record, document or thing with purpose to impair its verity or availability in such criminal investigation or official proceeding; or (2) makes, presents or uses any record, document or thing knowing it to be false and with purpose to mislead a public servant who is or may be engaged in such criminal investigation or official proceeding.

(b) Tampering with or fabricating physical evidence is a class D felony.

**ONCE AGAIN – this has been known since May of 2019 in some way by prosecution and easily confirmed since the Jan. 2020 seizure of authentic emails from Google authorized by Judge Wenzel. SOMEONE IS AT LARGE FOR NEARLY 3 YEARS!!!**

**I AM ENTITLED TO THIS DISCOVERY EVIDENCE UNDER THE LAW.  
IT IS TIME THE PROSECUTION SUBMIT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.**

**I AM ENTITLED TO THESE SEIZED EMAILS.**

THE DEFENDANT  
JAMES LAWRENCE

BY:



Pro Se